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Abstract
This paper studies the dynamic e¤ects of the scal policy shock on private
activity using an array of vector autoregressive models for the post-war US data.
We are particularly interested in the role of consumer sentiment in the trans-
mission of the government spending shock. Our major ndings are as follows.
Private consumption and investment fail to rise persistently in response to pos-
itive spending shocks especially when shocks are anticipated, while they exhibit
persistent and signicant increases when the sentiment shock occurs. Employ-
ment and real wages in the private sector also respond signicantly positively
only to the sentiment shock. Consumer sentiment responds negatively to a pos-
itive scal shock, resulting in subsequent decreases in private activity. That
is, our empirical ndings imply that the government spending shock generates
consumer pessimism, which then weakens the e¤ectiveness of the scal policy.
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1 Introduction
Observing the sluggish recovery from the recent Great Recession, the economics pro-
fession has revived the debate on the e¤ectiveness of the scal policy in stimulating
economic activity. Can increases in government spending help promote private sector
activity? And if so, will key variables of interest such as consumption, investment, em-
ployment, and real wages respond persistently positively to expansionary scal policy?
There is a large literature on this issue. One group of researchers reports positive
responses of consumption, real wages, and output to expansionary scal shocks, which
are consistent with the New Keynesian macroeconomic model in general. See, among
others, Rotemberg and Woodford (1992), Devereux, Head, and Laphan (1996), Fatas
and Mihov (2001), Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Perotti (2005), Galí, López-Salido,
and Vallés (2007).
On the contrary, many other research works provide strong evidence of negative
responses of consumption and real wages to scal spending shocks. See, for example,
Aiyagari, Chirstiano, and Eichenbaum (1992), Hall (1986), Ramey and Shapiro (1998),
Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999), Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (2004),
Cavallo (2005), Mountford and Uhlig (2009), Ramey (2013), and Owyang, Ramey, and
Zubairy (2013). As Ramey (2011) explains, these negative responses to an expansionary
government spending shock are consistent with a negative wealth e¤ect that often
appears in the neoclassical macroeconomic model such as Aiyagari, Christiano, and
Eichenbaum(1992) and Baxter and King (1993).1
One related literature focuses on the output multiplier of government spending.
Empirical evidence is again mixed. For instance, Ramey and Shapiro (1998), Hall
(2009), Barro and Redlick (2011), and Ramey (2011) obtained fairly low, say less
than one, government spending multiplier estimates, while Hall (2009) and Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2009) show that scal multipliers can be high when the
nominal interest rate is bounded at zero. Overall, the range of scal multiplier estimates
in the literature is very wide (Ramey, 2011). Also, scal multiplier estimates seem to
vary greatly across countries depending on key country characteristics such as the
exchange rate regime and public indebtedness. See Corsetti, Meier, and Müller (2012)
1Increases in government spending may result in a negative wealth e¤ect because government
decits may have to be nanced by tax hikes in the future. Rational consumers reduce consumption
and increase labor supply in response to spending shocks, resulting in a decrease in the real wage.
Note that such responses would occur even when government raises revenues by non-distortionary
lump-sum tax.
2
and Ilzetxki, Mendoza, and Vegh (2013) for details.
Another interesting question is whether the government spending shock is more
powerful during times of slack. Again, empirical evidence is mixed. For example,
Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012), Mittnik and Semmler (2012) and Fazzari, Morley,
and Panovska (2013) report much higher scal multipliers in a regime of a low economic
activity than those in a high regime activity, whereas Owyang, Ramey, and Zubairy
(2013) and Ramey and Zubairy (2014) nd no such evidence.
Observing such mixed empirical evidence on the e¤ectiveness of scal stimulus,
we study how the government spending shock inuences private activity in the US.
Finding negligibly weak or even negative responses of private activity to the scal
spending shock, we introduce and highlight the role of consumer sentiment in the
propagation of expansionary scal shocks to promote economic activity.
We are not the rst who discussed the interaction between consumer sentiment
and economic activity. Hall (1993) and Blanchard (1993), for example, underline the
causal e¤ects of animal spirit on economic activity in their explanation of the 1990-
1991 recession. On the other hand, Cochrane (1994) points out that close relationship
between innovations in consumer condence and subsequent changes in economic ac-
tivity appear because consumer condence shocks reect news about future economic
productivity. Beaudry and Portier (2004, 2006) also propose a similar model. Barsky
and Sims (2012) evaluate empirical relevance of these factors in explaining innovations
in consumer condence. They showed that condence innovations are better charac-
terized by the latter, even though animal spirit also has non-negligible contribution.
Using a nonlinear VAR framework, Bachman and Sims (2012) report high scal mul-
tiplier estimates during periods of economic slack. They put an emphasis on the role
of condence, which embodies information of future productivity improvements in re-
sponse to scal spending shocks during recessions. By the same token, Bachman and
Sims (2012) argue that consumers might become more optimistic in response to the
scal shock during times of economic slack, which sharply contrasts with our work that
reports solid negative responses of consumer sentiment to the scal shock in all phases
of business cycle.
We are particularly interested in the role of consumer sentiment in propagation
mechanism of the government spending shock to private activity such as consumption
and investment, excluding the government sector component from the total GDP. For
this purpose, we employ an array of identication methods for the scal shock that in-
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cludes conventional recursively identied structural VAR models and the expectational
VAR (EVAR) models of Ramey (2011) for the post war US data.2 We employ the two
EVAR models, one with her news (NEWS) variable and the other one with the survey
of professional forecasters (SPF ) data. Our major empirical ndings are as follows.
First, government spending shocks are not e¤ective in stimulating private activity.
For example, consumption responds positively for a very short period of time, then
becomes negative in longer-term. When we assume that changes in scal spending are
anticipated by utilizing Rameys (2011) expectational VAR, scal policy shocks become
completely ine¤ective as we observe virtually no positive responses since the impact.
Similarly, we were unable to nd any persistently positive responses of investment
to scal spending shocks. On the other hand, we observe solid positive responses of
consumption and investment to the sentiment shock from all models we consider in the
present paper.
Second, we observe that consumer sentiment rapidly deteriorate to a negative region
since the impact of the scal spending shock, leading to subsequent decreases in con-
sumption and investment. That is, unexpected increases in the government spending
generate consumer pessimism, which may weaken the scal policy e¤ect on the pri-
vate sector GDP. We show that our empirical ndings are consistent with a view that
consumer sentiment leads private activity rather than it passively reects the current
state of the economy.
Lastly, the scal shock seems to be ine¤ective in improving the labor market con-
dition either, while the real wage and private sector jobs show solid positive increases
when sentiment shocks occur.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses our VAR
models with alternative identication methods. We also discuss econometric features of
our models as to the robustness of our empirical ndings to alternative Wold orderings.
In Section 3, we present a data description and our major empirical ndings. We also
discuss the role of a sentiment channel in the propagation mechanism of the scal
spending shock. Section 4 provides an array of robustness check and additional VAR
analyses. Section 5 concludes.
2Perotti (2011) named these models of Rameys (2011) the expectational VAR model.
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2 The Econometric Model
Abstracting from deterministic terms, we employ the following vector autoregressive
(VAR) model.
xt =
pX
j=1
Ajxt j + "t; (1)
where
xt = [gt yt sentt zt]
0
gt denotes a vector of (or a scalar) government spending variables, yt is a vector (or
a scalar) of private activity variables such as consumption (conmt) and investment
(invtt), sentt is a scalar sentiment variable, and zt is a vector of control variables that
includes tax rate (trt), the interest rate (it), and the monetary aggregate (mt). All
variables are demeaned and detrended, up to quadratic trend, prior to estimations.
We limit out attention to a closed economy VAR model to make the model as simple
as possible.3
Motivated by Rameys (2013) work, we employ an array of VAR models based on
alternative identication methods for the government spending shock. Our rst model,
TGOV, resembles conventional VAR models with the government spending ordered
rst. Put it di¤erently, we identify the government spending shock by unexpected
increases in the total government spending (tgovt), that is, gt = tgovt. For similar
models, see, among others, Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Perotti (2005, 2008), and
Galí, López-Salido, and Vallés (2007).
We also employ VAR models which is dubbed the EVAR (expectational VAR) ap-
proach by utilizing her "news" variable as well as the survey of professional forecasters
data. That is, gt = newst (NEWS) and gt = spft (SPF ), respectively. Ramey (2011)
points out that government spending shocks, when identied with standard Choleski
decomposition (recursively identied) VAR models, might not be appropriate because
planned changes in scal variables such as military spending are likely to be anticipated
by market participants before the government actually implements it. In order to deal
with this timing issue, she constructed a "news" variable by estimating changes in the
expected present value of government spending, utilizing information from Business
Week and several other mass media sources. She also constructed an alternative news
3That is, we do not pay much attention to the scal policy e¤ect on the net exports. For an open
economy model, additional variables such as the exchange rate, foreign incomes, and the domestic
and foreign prices should be added to the system.
5
variable via the one-quarter ahead forecast error of scal spending growth rates, using
the Survey of Professional Forecasters from the Philadelphia Fed.
Perotti (2011), however, argues that Rameys EVAR is equivalent to a model with
gt = [fgovt; tgovt]
0, where fgovt denotes the federal government (or military) spending.
We also employ such a model and denote it FGOV model. Following Perotti (2011) and
Ramey (2013), we also put tgovt next to newst for the EVAR models. Our empirical
models are summarized as follows.4
TGOV : xt = [tgovt invtt conmt sentt trt it mt]0 (2)
FGOV : xt = [fgovt tgovt invtt conmt sentt trt it mt]0
NEWS : xt = [newst tgovt invtt conmt sentt trt it mt]0
SPF : xt = [spft tgovt invtt conmt sentt trt it mt]0
For visual inspection of the data, we plot estimated scal spending shocks (residu-
als) as well as original spending variables from these alternative VAR models in Figure
1. Rameys (2011) (raw) news and SPF variables look quite di¤erent from other two
variables that are trending upward. However, residuals of these variables, that is, the
estimated government spending shock identied from each model, look similar each
other. That is, all these four measures of scal shocks seem fairly consistent with each
other.
Figure 1 around here
It is well-known that econometric inferences from recursively identied VAR models
might not be robust to alternative VAR orderings. Fiscal spending e¤ects under our
framework do not su¤er from this ordering problem. For example, consider a VAR
with xt = [x1;t; x2;t] , where x1;t is a vector of variables with a known ordering, while
the ordering of x2;t is completely unknown. Kim, Kim, and Stern (2015) demonstrate
that all impulse-response functions of the entire variables in xt to the shock to one of
the variables in x1;t are una¤ected by arbitrary reshu­ ing of the x2;t variables.
Note that gt is ordered rst in all models with an assumption that these spending
variables are not contemporaneously inuenced by innovations in other variables within
4We also implemented estimations without the total government spending for FGOV, NEWS, and
SPF models. We obtained qualitatively very similar results. See non-for-publication appendix for all
results, which is available from authors upon request.
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one quarter.5 Therefore, the impulse-response functions to the government spending
shock under the present framework are invariant to all alternative orderings of the
remaining variables in the system. That is, all response functions to the scal spending
shock are "identical" even if we randomly shu­ e the variables next to gt in the system
as long as gt is ordered rst.
However, response functions to the sentiment shock are not invariant to the ordering
of the VAR, because st is ordered in the middle of the system. We implemented an array
of robustness check analyses putting the sentiment variables in di¤erent locations from
the rst to the last. We obtained qualitatively very similar results, thus we maintain
the ordering described in (1) throughout the paper.
3 Empirical Findings
3.1 Data Descriptions
We use quarterly frequency data from 1960:I to 2013:II. We obtained most of our
data from the FRED with a few exceptions. The news series (newst) is obtained from
Valerie Rameys website.6 We obtained the consumer sentiment index (sentt) data from
the University of Michigans Survey of Consumers database. The consumer sentiment
index comes with two sub-indices, the current economic conditions index (ICC) and the
index of consumer expectations (ICE). That is, sentt is a combination of consumers
perception on the current economic conditions as well as economic conditions in the
near future. As can be seen in Figure 2, they are highly correlated each other, thus we
report empirical ndings mostly with the consumer sentiment index.
We use "total" government expenditures for government spending variables that
include transfer payments and interest payments as well as capital transfer payments.7
All public and private spending variables (tgovt; fgovt; conmt; invtt) are divided by
the GDP deator and population, then log-transformed. sentt is expressed in natural
5Unlike the monetary policy, scal policy actions may not be implemented immediately, because
in most cases, congress and the goverment work together to determine the government budget prior
to the scal year.
6For detailed explanations on how to construct her news variable, see the following webpage.
http://econweb.ucsd.edu/~vramey/research.html#data
7Total government expenditures is a broader measure than "government consumption expenditures
and gross investment," which is a government component of the total GDP. It is even greater than
"government current expenditures" because it includes items that a¤ect government activities in the
future such as capital transfer payments and net purchases of nonproduced assets.
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logarithm. trt denotes the government tax receipts divided by the total GDP. As to
the money market control variables, it denotes the three month Treasury Bills yield
and mt is the nominal M2, expressed in natural logarithm.
Figure 2 around here
The Survey of Professional Forecasters data were obtained from the Philadelphia
Fed. Starting from 1968:IV, forecasters were asked to predict nominal defense spending
until 1981:II, whereas they were asked to predict real federal spending since then. We
used the forecasts of the GDP deator to convert the nominal defense spending data
to real spending data.8 We also noticed 9 changes of base year in the national income
and product account (NIPA) during our full sample period. Since the SPF forecast
does not reect such changes, we rescaled all relevant forecast data with 2009 as the
common base year.9 Following Ramey (2011), we use the actual government spending
growth minus the forecast of it made one quarter earlier, that is, gt E(gtj
t 1) where

t 1 is the forecastersinformation set at time t  1, as the scal spending shock.
One caveat is that, following Ramey (2011), we combine forecast errors of defense
spending growth with those of federal spending growth rates in order to get the data
with reasonably long sample period. As she discussed, however, this news variable
explains substantial portion of changes in the federal spending growth. Further, we
use forecast errors instead of forecasts, which will minimize the cost of combining those
two data series. More detailed information on data is provided in Table 1.
Table 1 around here
3.2 Fiscal Spending Shocks and Private activity
As a preliminary exercise, we estimated scal spending e¤ects on the private GDP that
excludes the government spending component from the total GDP. Figure 3 reports the
8Nominal defense spending data from 1968:IV to 1981:II are obtained from Tom Stark at the
Philadelphia Fed.
9Ramey (2011) and Forni and Gambetti (2014) used growth rates of government spending forecasts
without adjusting for changes in base year. This is not ideal because their estimations can be inuenced
by suddent big changes in their scal spending variable up to 9 times.
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response function estimates of the private GDP to the scal spending shock and to the
sentiment shock using 4 alternative identication methods discussed in the previous
section. We also report the 95% condence bands obtained from 500 nonparametric
bootstrap simulations.
It should be noted that the scal shock has negligible or even negative e¤ects on the
private GDP in all models we consider, which is consistent with the ndings reported by
Ramey (2013). This implies that any evidence of positive responses of the total GDP to
the scal shock might be mainly due to an expansion of the public sector. Contrary to
the scal shock, the sentiment shock yields a persistently positive e¤ect on the private
GDP over 2 years, which is signicant at the 5%. We note that this nding is consistent
with the work by Hall (1993), Blanchard (1993), Cochrane (1994), and Bachman and
Sims (2012), for example, in the sense that we also nd close relationship between
consumer sentiment and economic activity. However, our ndings contrast sharply
with those of Bachman and Sims (2012) qualitatively, because they argue that the
government spending shock has a positive e¤ect on consumer condence during times
of slack.10 In what follows, we show that the government spending shock generates
consumer pessimism rather than optimism, which then weakens private activity.
Figure 3 around here
Next, we report impulse-response function estimates of private consumption and
investment to the scal spending shock in Figure 4.11 Consumption responds signif-
icantly positively only in the short-run (less than a year) under TGOV and FGOV
identication schemes, while no meaningful or even signicantly negative responses are
observed when the EVAR models are employed. Investment responses to the scal
shock turn out to be mostly negligible and insignicant with an exception of those
from SPF model, where we obtained a signicantly negative harmful e¤ect of the s-
cal shock on investment. These responses of consumption and investment would be
consistent with negligible responses of the private GDP to the scal shock reported
earlier.
Figure 4 around here
10It should be noted, however, that our models do not allow such nonlinearity in the impulse-
response function estimations.
11Complete response function estimates are reported in the non-for-publication appendix.
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One of our major objectives is to identify propagation channels through which scal
spending shocks possibly a¤ect private activity. We view the consumer sentiment as
a potential candidate. For this purpose, we report the impulse-response functions of
sentt to the scal spending shock in Figure 5. Note that under the TGOV, FGOV,
ana SPF schemes, consumer sentiment rapidly falls below zero immediately after the
impact of the scal spending shock, which might play a key role in explaining why
initially positive responses of consumption quickly deteriorate to negative ones. That
is, positive scal spending shocks may be interpreted as a sign of weak economy, which
might make consumers more pessimistic, resulting in decreases in private spending.
Naturally, such changes in consumer sentiment may weaken the e¤ectiveness of the
expansionary scal policy as consumption and investment fall in response to the scal
shock. Under the NEWS VAR, we observe no meaningful responses of the sentiment,
which is consistent with virtually zero-responses of consumption to the scal shock
under the same model.
In what follows, we also show that "total" consumption responses shown in Figure
4 are more closely related with those of nondurable goods and services consumption
rather than durable goods consumption. That is, consumption responses to the scal
shock seem to be mainly driven by temporary changes in nondurable goods consump-
tion. One way to interpret Figures 4 and 5 together would be the following. When
scal shocks are anticipated as assumed in the EVAR models, scal shocks tend to
generate consumer pessimism, resulting in decreases or no meaningful changes in con-
sumption. When scal shocks are actually materialized, that is, when identied scal
shocks are the same as the actual increases in scal spending as in TGOV and FGOV
models, consumers respond to it by increasing nondurable goods consumption because
they view increases in income as windfall. In other words, they may do so because they
believe scal shocks are not going to permanently change the direction of the economy
towards booms.
Overall, scal policy e¤ects on private activity seem to be weak and short-lived
if any. Further, the scal spending shock seems to fail to improve, even decrease,
consumer sentiment, which may cause decreases in consumption and investment. To
investigate such possibility, we report and discuss our impulse-response function esti-
mates of private activity to the sentiment shock in next section.
Figure 5 around here
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3.3 Consumer Sentiment Shocks and Private activity
Responses of private activity to the sentiment shock sharply contrast with those to the
scal shock. As can be seen in Figure 6, both investment and consumption respond
positively for a prolonged period of time in response to the sentiment shock in all
four models. That is, we obtained robust evidence of persistently positive e¤ects of
the sentiment shock on private activity. Especially, consumption responses are highly
signicant at the 5% level for over three years. Even though investment responses
are not signicant at the 5% level, its point estimates are substantially skewed to the
positive area.
Responses of the government spending to the sentiment shock are overall negative,
reported in not-for-publication appendix, though either insignicant or marginally sig-
nicant. This is not surprising because scal spending tends to be counter-cyclical.
That is, government spending normally falls below the trend when the private GDP
(consumption and investment) rises during economic booms.
In contrast to the responses to the scal shock, the impulse-response function es-
timates to the sentiment shock are not invariant to alternative orderings since sentt
is put after the scal variable and private spending variables. For robustness check,
we implemented the same analysis with the sentiment variable ordered next to gt. We
also experimented with the sentiment variable ordered last. All results were qualita-
tively very similar. That is, our ndings on the sentiment e¤ect are quite robust to
alternative orderings.12
Figure 6 around here
3.4 Fiscal Shock and the Role of a Sentiment Channel
We observe that all four models including the two EVAR models imply solid positive
e¤ects of the sentiment shock on private spending. We note that these ndings may
provide some useful insights on the ine¤ectiveness of the scal policy in promoting pri-
vate activity as reported in the previous section. That is, the scal spending shock may
not be able to stimulate consumption and investment if it fails to generate consumer
12All results are available upon request.
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(or entrepreneur) optimism as can be seen in Figure 5. In other words, the e¤ectiveness
of the scal spending shock may critically hinge upon a sentiment channel.
Observing sudden increases in the government decit, consumers may revise down
their economic growth forecasts in the future, interpreting such policy actions as a
clear sign of serious economic downturns, which may persist for a while. In this sense,
our conjecture is consistent with the "news" e¤ect discussed in Cochrane (1994) and
Bachman and Sims (2012), even though Bachman and Sims (2012) are more optimistic
on the role of the expansionary scal policy.
One may argue against this conjecture by the following logic. Consumption and
investment may fall after the spending shock occurs for some unknown reason, and the
sentiment passively reect such decreases in private GDP. We are skeptical to such a
possibility for the following reasons.
As we can see in Figure 4, consumption tends to rise for a short period of time in
response to the scal shock when TGOV and the FGOV models are employed, whereas
consumer sentiment falls almost immediately after the impact under these models.
These responses are inconsistent with a view that consumer sentiment passively reects
changes in the current private GDP. If that is the case, the sentiment response should
have resembled initially positive responses of consumption for about a year since the
impact of the scal shock. Furthermore, it should be noted that the consumer sentiment
is constructed to measure consumersperception on the future economic conditions as
well as the current conditions. Therefore, immediate declines of the sentiment which
contrast to short-run increases in consumption imply that consumer sentiment does not
passively reect changes in private activity. Put it di¤erently, our response function
estimates overall imply the existence of a sentiment channel where the sentiment plays
a leading role in determining private activity.
4 Additional VAR Analyses
4.1 E¤ects on Durable and Nondurable Goods Consumption
This subsection estimates the e¤ects of the scal and the sentiment shocks on two
sub-components of private consumption: consumption of durable goods (condt) and
consumption of non-durable goods and services (connt). One motivation of this exer-
cise is that consumers tend to adjust consumption pattern for durable goods such as
automobiles and houses when they expect persistent changes in economic conditions,
12
while non-durable goods consumption might be also inuenced by temporary changes
in incomes. For this purpose, we replace conmt with condt or connt in (2), then re-
estimate the VAR models. Impulse-response function estimates are reported in Figures
7 and 8.
Overall, durable good consumption does not respond signicantly to the scal shock
with an exception of SPF model which shows signicantly negative responses. Non-
durable good consumption exhibit signicantly positive responses for a short period of
time under the TGOV and FGOV schemes. We note that nondurable good consump-
tion shows signicantly positive responses for a while under the SPF identication
scheme. Note also that durable good consumption responses under the same scheme
exhibit much stronger decreases that dominate the positive responses of nondurable
good consumption, which is consistent with decreases in the total consumption reported
earlier.
Response function estimates of total consumption to the scal shock shown in Fig-
ure 4 resemble those of nondurable goods consumption in Figure 8 more than durable
goods consumption responses in Figure 7. Put it di¤erently, scal shock e¤ects on
total consumption are overall driven by responses of connt instead of those of condt.
Since consumers tend to buy more durable goods such as automobiles and home ap-
pliances when they are condent that the economy would continue to expand, these
ndings imply scal shocks fail to generate consumer optimism on economic conditions
in the near future, which seems consistent with insignicant and negligible responses
of durable goods consumption to the scal shock.
In contrast, total consumption responses to the sentiment shock are somewhat in
between those of durables and nondurables consumption responses. That is, in response
to a positive sentiment shock, durable goods consumption also rises signicantly and
persistently no matter what identication methods are employed.
Figures 7 and 8 around here
4.2 E¤ects on Private Employment
As Ramey (2013) points out, scal spending e¤ects on private jobs may di¤er depend-
ing on the nature of government spending. If scal spending occurs mainly through
government purchases of private sector goods and services, the scal spending shock
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may increase private employment. On the contrary, increases in government value
added that include mainly compensation of public employees may decrease private sec-
tor jobs as the public sector employment rises given the labor force, eroding the private
sector jobs.
We estimate and report private sector labor market e¤ects of the scal shock as
well as those of the sentiment shock. For this purpose, we replace invtt and conmt in
(2) with private jobs (pjobt). Results are reported in Figure 9. We observe that scal
shocks again fail to increase private employment when TGOV, FGOV, and SPF models
are employed, while it temporarily increases private jobs in the short-run when NEWS
model is used. Overall, responses of the private sector jobs are either insignicant
or even negative. On the contrary, the sentiment shock has a solid positive e¤ect on
private employment that lasts several years since the shock occurs no matter what
identication methods are employed.
In a nutshell, private labor market e¤ects of the scal spending shock are weak and
mostly insignicant, which contrast sharply with the sentiment e¤ect that results in
persistently positive increases in private sector jobs. These ndings might explain why
recent increases in scal spending fail to reduce unemployment for a prolonged period
of time after the Great Recession. That is, falling private spending may weaken job
creation e¤ects of the government spending shock as it creates consumer pessimism in
the economy, which in turn reduces private spending.
Figure 9 around here
4.3 E¤ects on Private Wages
Private wages may rise in response to the scal shock in either cases of government
purchases of private sector goods or increases in government value added. On the other
hand, private sector wages may fall if rational consumers, expecting a tax hike in the
near future, increase the labor supply su¢ ciently. If scal shocks result in decreases in
private activity, as implied by our estimation results, there will be negative e¤ects on
private wages due to decreases in consumption and investment.
We empirically appraise the e¤ects of the scal shock on private wages by replacing
invtt and conmt in (2) with private wages (pwagt). As can be seen in Figure 10, we
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observe slightly positive e¤ects of the scal shock on private wages that are mostly
insignicant from three VAR specications with an exception of SPF model. That is,
potentially positive e¤ects of scal spending shocks are likely to be muted by negative
responses of private spending, which result in decreases in demand for private sector
goods and services. On the contrary, private wages respond persistently and positively
to the sentiment shock for over three years that are signicant at the 5% levels. Solid
increases in private wages seem to be caused by increases in the demand for labor,
because sentiment shocks promote private activity persistently.
Figure 10 around here
4.4 Current or Forward Looking Sentiment?
We further experiment our analyses with two sub-indices of the consumer sentiment
index: the index of current economic conditions (ICC) and the index of consumer
expectations (ICE). For example, Bachman and Sims (2012) use ICE instead of the
combined sentiment index used in the present paper. Even though their approach has
some merits, the forward-looking sentiment data (ICE), behaves very similarly to the
current economic conditions index (ICC) as we saw in Figure 2.
Nonetheless, we estimate VAR models after replacing the consumer sentiment index
(sentt) with these two sub-indices. Results are reported in Figures 11 and 12. We
obtain very similar impulse-response functions as the ones reported in Figure 4. We
also estimate and report the responses of these sentiment sub-indices to the scal shock
in Figure 13, which again resemble those in Figure 5 with the combined sentiment data.
Therefore, our results are robust to the choice of alternative sentiment variables.
Figures 11, 12, and 13 around here
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4.5 Sub-Sample Analysis
We also investigate the consequences of combining forecast errors for the real defense
spending growth rate with those for the real federal spending growth rate via the SPF
data. Following Ramey (2011), we combined these two series in order to obtain long-
horizon data. Key results from a shorter sample period from 1981:III to 2013:II, the
period with the real federal spending growth rate forecast errors, are reported in Figure
14.13
In a nutshell, we obtain very similar impulse-response functions as the ones reported
previously. Consumption and investment respond signicantly negatively to the scal
shock, while they rise persistently when the sentiment shock occurs.
Figure 14 around here
4.6 Nonlinear Model Estimates
Lastly, we study the possibility of nonlinear responses of the sentiment to the scal
shock. For this purpose, we employ the following two-regime threshold VAR (TVAR)
model. Abstracting from deterministic terms, we use,
xt =
 
pX
j=1
ARj xt j
!
I(t d <  ) +
 
pX
j=1
ABj xt j
!
I(t d >  ) + "t; (3)
where I is the indicator function and t d is a d-period lagged threshold variable that
represents the present state of the economy. We use the (total) GDP growth rate for
this threshold variable in order to investigate nonlinear responses of the sentiment to
the scal shock during di¤erent phases of the business cycle. ARj (L) and A
B
j (L) are
lag polynomial matrices during economic recessions (t d <  ) and booms (t d >
 ), respectively. We use a one-dimensional grid search method to identify   by
minimizing ln
^, where ^ is the variance-covariance matrix given a ne grid point
t d 2 f0:15; :::; 0:85g. We trimmed 15% of the data from each side to make sure we use
enough number of observations in each regime. Conventional delay parameter d = 1
was employed.
13All results are reported in the not-for-publication appendix and are available from authors.
16
It should be noted that we need to reduce the dimension of our VAR system sub-
stantially for proper estimations of this type of TVAR models. For example, our
FGOV model with three lags requires estimations of 82  3 reduced-form coe¢ cients
for each regime, which may not be feasible with a small grid point such as 0:15, be-
cause not enough number of observations may be used to estimate coe¢ cients with
such specications. Since we are mainly interested in nonlinear responses of the sen-
timent to the scal spending shock, we employ a simple trivariate TVAR model with
xt = [gt priyt sentt]
0, where gt = tgovt; fgovt; ramyt; spft. Regime-specic impulse-
response function estimates of the sentiment to the scal shock are reported in Figure
15.14
From all 4 VAR models, we obtain solid negative responses of the sentiment to the
scal shock in both regimes, which sharply contrasts to the work of Bachman and Sims
(2012). Instead of nding positive (optimism) responses, we observed that the scal
spending shock during recessions generates consumer pessimism as in our previous
results from the linear model. We also obtain solid negative responses of sentt to the
scal shock during economic booms as well. Put it di¤erently, our evidence of consumer
pessimism in response to the scal shock seems to be robust to di¤erent states of the
economy, which is consistent with the work of Owyang, Ramey, and Zubairy (2013) and
Ramey and Zubairy (2014). We also note that consumer sentiment shows improvement
for a while since the occurence of the scal shock during economic booms especially
in SPF model. However, sentt rapidly falls and enters a negative region, showing no
persistent improvement in the sentiment.
Figure 15 around here
5 Conclusion
The recent Great Recession accompanied by the slow recovery triggered an active de-
bate on the e¤ectiveness of the scal policy in stimulating economic growth. Empirical
evidence is at best mixed and the economics profession has failed to reach a consensus.
14We report regime-specic impulse-response function estimates based on the point estimates, since
the main objective of this exercise is to see whether theres evidence of quaitatively di¤erent responses
of sentt in di¤erent phases of business cycle. For more rigorous analysis, we need to estimate the
generalized impulse-response functions for nonlinear models (Koop, Pesaran, and Potter, 1996).
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This paper takes a di¤erent road and attempts to understand what inuences the
e¤ects of the scal policy on the private sector economy. For this purpose, we introduce
the role of consumer sentiment in a propagation mechanism for government spending
shocks towards economic activity in the private sector. As Ramey (2011) points out,
statistical inferences may be inuenced by alternative identication methods for the
spending shock. Thus, we employ an array of recursively identied VAR models as
well as the two types of the expectational VAR model. We obtain solid evidence of the
existence of a consumer sentiment channel that is robust to alternative identication
methods.
Our major ndings are as follows. First, our empirical results imply a very weak,
even negative e¤ect of the government spending shock on private sector spending such
as consumption and investment, which conrms the conclusion by Ramey (2013). On
the contrary, innovations in the consumer sentiment generate solid positive responses of
consumption and investment for a prolonged period of time. Third, consumer sentiment
negatively responds to the government spending shock since the impact, while under
the conventional VAR schemes, consumption shows positive responses, mainly from
nondurable good consumption, for a brief period of time, then quickly deteriorates
to a negative region. This implies that the scal policy may become ine¤ective in
stimulating economic activity because it generates consumer pessimism that results in
subsequent decreases in consumption and investment. That is, consumer sentiment
channel may be a key in understanding the propagation mechanism of scal policy
shocks. Similar evidence are also obtained from private sector labor market variables.
Employment and real wages in the private sector respond signicantly positively only
to the sentiment shock.
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Figure 1. Government Spending Data
Level Variables
Residuals
Note: TGOV, FGOV, NEWS, and SPF denote the total government spending, federal govern-
ment spending, news variable (Ramey, 2011), and SPF variable (Ramey, 2011). Residuals are
obtained from VAR regressions.
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Figure 2. Consumer Sentiment Index Data
Note: We obtained the data from Surveys of Consumers website at the University of Michigan.
All indices are normalized to be 100 in 1960Q1 by authors.
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Figure 3. Private GDP Responses
Fiscal Shock
Sentiment Shock
Note: Private GDP is obtained by substracting the government spending from the total GDP.
We report responses of the private GDP to the scal spending shock from each model. Dashed
lines are the 95% condence band of the response function from 500 nonparametric bootstrap
simulations.
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Figure 4. Private Activity Responses to the Fiscal Shock
Consumption Responses
Investment Responses
Note: Dashed lines are the 95% condence band of the response function from 500 nonparametric
bootstrap simulations.
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Figure 5. Sentiment Responses to the Fiscal Shock
Note: Dashed lines are the 95% condence band of the response function from 500 nonparametric
bootstrap simulations.
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Figure 6. Private Activity Responses to the Sentiment Shock
Consumption Responses
Investment Responses
Note: Dashed lines are the 95% condence band of the response function from 500 nonparametric
bootstrap simulations.
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Figure 7. Responses of Durable Goods Consumption to the Fiscal Shock
Fiscal Shock
Sentiment Shock
Note: Dashed lines are the 95% condence band of the response function from 500 nonparametric
bootstrap simulations.
29
Figure 8. Responses of Nondurables Good and Services Consumption
Fiscal Shock
Sentiment Shock
Note: Dashed lines are the 95% condence band of the response function from 500 nonparametric
bootstrap simulations.
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Figure 9. Responses of Private Job
Fiscal Shock
Sentiment Shock
Note: Dashed lines are the 95% condence band of the response function from 500 nonparametric
bootstrap simulations.
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Figure 10. Responses of Private Wage
Fiscal Shock
Sentiment Shock
Note: Dashed lines are the 95% condence band of the response function from 500 nonparametric
bootstrap simulations.
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Figure 11. Responses to the Fiscal Shock with ICE
Consumption Responses
Investment Responses
Notes: ICE denotes the index of consumer expectations.
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Figure 12. Responses to the Fiscal Shock with ICC
Consumption Responses
Investment Responses
Notes: ICC denotes the index of current economic conditions.
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Figure 13. Sentiment Responses to the Fiscal Shock: Sub-Indices
ICE
ICC
Notes: ICE and ICC denote the index of consumer expectations and the index of current
economic conditions, respectively.
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Figure 14. Sub-Sample Analysis: 1981:III - 2013:II
Notes: Response function estimates are from SPF model with the SPF forecast error of the
federal spending growth rate excluding the forecast error of the defense spending growth rate.
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Figure 15. Sentiment Responses to the Fiscal Shock: Threshold VAR
Notes: Sentiment responses to the scal shock are reported. The threshold variable (t 1) is
one-period lagged log di¤erenced real (total) GDP. Solid lines are responses during recessions
(t 1< ), while dashed lines are those in booms (t 1> ). The estimates are from tri-
variate VAR models with the scal variable, the private GDP, and the sentiment variable.
37
Table 1. Data Descriptions
Data ID Description
GDP Gross Domestic Product
PCE Personal Consumption Expenditures
PCEDG Personal Consumption Expenditures: Durable Goods
PCEND Personal Consumption Expenditures: Nondurable Goods
PCES Personal Consumption Expenditures: Services
GPDI Gross Private Domestic Investment
W068RCQ027SBEA Government total expenditures
W019RCQ027SBEA Federal government total expenditures
GDPDEF Gross Domestic Product: Implicit Price Deator, Index 2009 =100
W006RC1Q027SBEA Federal government current tax receipts
POP Total Population: All Ages including Armed Forces Overseas
TB3MS 3-Month Treasury Bill: Secondary Market Rate
M2 M2 Money Stock
USPRIV All Employees: Total Private Industries
A132RC1Q027SBEA Compensation of employees: Wages and salaries, Private industries
UMCSENT Consumer Sentiment Index: Survey of University of Michigan
SPF Survey of Professional Forecasters from Philadelphia Fed.
Note: We obtained most data from the Fred. UMCSENT is from the Surveys of Consumers
website at the University of Michigan. "News" variable is from Valerie Rameys website. "SPF"
denotes the mean responses of the real federal government spending data from the Survey of
Professional Forecasters database obtained from the Philadelphia Fed website. The data prior
to 1981 (government military spending data) is obtained from Tom Stark at the Philadelphia
Fed.
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Not-for-Publication Appendix
Figure A1. Private GDP VAR
xt = [fgovt priyt sentt trt it mt]
0
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Figure A2. TG VAR
xt = [tgovt invtt conmt sentt trt it mt]
0
40
Figure A3. NEWS VAR I
xt = [newst invtt conmt sentt trt it mt]
0
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Figure A4. SPF VAR I
xt = [spft invtt conmt sentt trt it mt]
0
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Figure A5. FG VAR
xt = [fgovt tgovt invtt conmt sentt trt it mt]
0
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Figure A6. NEWS VAR II
xt = [newst tgovt invtt conmt sentt trt it mt]
0
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Figure A7. SPF VAR II
xt = [spft tgovt invtt conmt sentt trt it mt]
0
45
Figure A7. SPF VAR I: 1981:III - 2013:II
xt = [spft invtt conmt sentt trt it mt]
0
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Figure A8. SPF VAR II: 1981:III - 2013:II
xt = [spft tgovt invtt conmt sentt trt it mt]
0
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